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REASONABLENESS AS A RULE: A PAEAN
TO JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT IN
ATWATER V. CITY OF LAGO VISTA
Wayne A. Logan*
When invited to participate in this symposium, and asked
to identify a particular dissent from the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment caselaw to focus upon, many candidates
came to mind. The dissents of Justices Douglas in Terry v.
Ohio' and Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States' had strong
immediate appeal, and indeed are ably addressed by other sym-
posium contributors.3 I wished, however, to consider a dissent
of more recent vintage-yet one having similar foundational
force relative to Fourth Amendment principles and significant
impact on policing and civil liberties. With these criteria in
mind, I soon settled upon my dissent of choice: that of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.4
Atwater, the "soccer mom" case as it has come to be known,
answered a basic question long left unresolved by the Court:
. Gary and Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
Florida State University College of Law. The Article is based on remarks offered at the
"Great Fourth Amendment Dissents" symposium hosted by the University of Mississippi
School of Law and cosponsored by the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law
and the National Judicial College, February 12-13, 2009. I thank Professor Thomas
Clancy for his warm hospitality during the symposium and Christopher Ewbank (J.D.
'09) and Andrew Grogan (J.D. '10) for their excellent research assistance.
' 392 U.S. 1, 35 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
' See Carol Steiker, Brandeis in Olmstead: "Our Government is the Potent, Omni-
present Teacher", 79 MiSS. L.J. 147 (2009); Paul Butler, "A Long Step Down the Totalita-
rian Path": Justice Douglas's Great Dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 79 MISS. L.J. 9 (2009). The
question of what qualifies as a great dissent has inspired considerable interest of late.
See I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES (Mark
Tushnet ed., 2008); William J. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427
(1986); Robert G. Flanders, The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate
Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 401
(1999); Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARv. L. REV. 4
(2008); Allison 0. Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447 (2008); Ran-
dall T. Shepard, What Can Dissents Teach Us?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 337 (2005).
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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whether a warrantless arrest for a minor offense violates the
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment, the Amend-
ment's "touchstone."5 In her dissent, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice O'Connor condemned the majori-
ty's approval of a motorist's custodial arrest for failure to wear a
seatbelt, punishable under Texas law only by a modest fine.6
The outcome, O'Connor fairly concluded, afforded police "consti-
tutional carte blanche to effect an arrest whenever there is
probable cause to believe a fine-only misdemeanor has been
committed," an outcome "irreconcilable with the Fourth
Amendment's command that seizures be reasonable." While
conceding the administrative appeal of providing police the un-
qualified right to arrest for any and all offenses, Justice
O'Connor asserted that such appeal "by no means trumps the
values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the Amendment's
protections."8 Administrative ease, O'Connor insisted, falls "far
short of rationalizing the extraordinary intrusion on Gail Atwa-
ter and her children."9
The majority's decision to equate probable cause with rea-
sonableness had two major ramifications, according to Justice
O'Connor. First, with probable cause now serving as both a ne-
cessary and sufficient basis for arrest, police were free to invoke
their arrest power for a myriad of minor offenses, having major
impact on the "everyday lives of Americans.""° Second, with
broadened warrantless arrest authority comes an "arsenal" of
police powers, including the power to search cars and drivers
and inventory the contents of their vehicles." The "unbounded
discretion" afforded police to execute arrests and exercise such
powers, Justice O'Connor reasoned, carried a "grave potential
for abuse." 2
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006).
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 366.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 371, 373.
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In the space available here, I will seek to make the case
that Justice O'Connor's Atwater dissent, wise when offered al-
most a decade ago, and prescient in light of subsequent events,
is deserving of a place in the pantheon of the Court's great
Fourth Amendment dissents.
I. ATWATER AND THE DEMISE OF REASONABLENESS
In March 1997, Gail Atwater was returning home after re-
trieving her two children (a boy and girl, ages three and five)
from soccer practice. 3 She slowly cruised her neighborhood
street in the small community of Lago Vista, Texas, driving the
family pickup truck at fifteen miles per hour, in the hope of
finding a cherished toy her son had dropped from the vehicle. 4
Police officer Barton Turek observed Atwater, together with her
children in the front seat, and noticed that neither Atwater nor
her children were wearing seat belts-in violation of Texas sta-
tutory law." After detaining Atwater at the side of the road,
Turek told her, 'Ve've met before," referring to a prior incident
when Turek mistakenly thought Atwater's son was not wearing
a seat belt. 6 He then "yell[ed]" that Atwater was "going to jail",
7
and rejected her request to take the children to a friend's home
nearby, despite the fact that they were "frightened, upset, and
crying." 8 Upon learning that Atwater lacked her driver's li-
cense and insurance documentation because her purse had been
stolen, a story he had "heard .. .two-hundred times," 9 Turek
handcuffed Atwater and transported her to the police station
(ironically enough, without first attaching her seat belt). ° Upon
" See Ross E. Milloy, Public Lives: For Seat-Belt Violator, a Jam, a Jail and Un-
moved Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2001, at A9.
14 Id.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-24.
6 Id. at 324 (citation omitted).
17 Id.
" Id. Alerted by the commotion, a friend eventually arrived and prevented the
children from being taken away by Turek, as he had threatened. Id. at 368-69
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 324 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
Id. at 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). A subsequent inventory of
Atwater's truck revealed two tricycles, a bicycle, a cooler, a bag of charcoal, toys, groce-
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arriving at the police station, Atwater was stripped of her per-
sonal possessions, subjected to a "mug shot," and placed in a
booking cell for approximately one hour before she was brought
before a magistrate and released on a $310 bond.2' Atwater
eventually pled no contest to the seat belt violation and paid a
$50 free.
22
After city officials rebuffed her request that police receive
better training and closer supervision, Atwater filed a civil
rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the warrantless ar-
rest for the fine-only seatbelt violation constituted an unreason-
able seizure under the Fourth Amendment.23 The trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and a
panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed.24 On rehearing en banc, the
Fifth Circuit again reversed.25 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, agreeing to address whether "the Fourth Amendment,
either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemea-
nor arrests or otherwise, limits police officers' authority to ar-
rest without warrant for minor criminal offenses."26
By a five-four vote, the Court affirmed.27 Justice Souter's
opinion for the majority first examined early common law and
framing era authorities on police power to execute warrantless
arrests for offenses not involving a "breach of the peace."28 The
upshot of this history, he wrote, is that "the common-law com-
mentators (as well as the sparsely reported cases) reached di-
vergent conclusions" on such police authority.29
Justice Souter noted that while several "eminent authori-
ties" supported the view that framing era warrantless arrest
ries, and two pairs of children's shoes. See Linda Greenhouse, Divided Justices Back
Full Arrests on Minor Charges, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at Al.
21 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324 (majority opinion).
Id. Atwater's other charges, driving without a license and failing to provide proof
of insurance, were dismissed. Id. In addition to the fine, Atwater paid $110 to retrieve
her truck from the police impoundment lot. See Editorial, An Erosion of Rights, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Apr. 30, 2001, at A10 (on file with author).
See Milloy, supra note 13.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1999).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 326.
21 Id. at 322.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 328 & n.2.
118 [VOL.79:1
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power was quite limited, the record was insufficient to support a
conclusion that Atwater's arrest violated the Fourth Amend-
ment." In particular, Justice Souter noted a 1631 English case
upholding a warrantless arrest for dice play, later cited by sev-
eral eighteenth-century commentators for the proposition that
nonfelony arrest authority was not limited to breaches of the
peace.3' Early statutes, he explained, further undermined the
view that officers were categorically barred from executing ar-
rests for non-breach-of-the-peace misdemeanors.32
Justice Souter next evaluated whether subsequent authori-
ty or practice clarified the warrantless arrest authority of offic-
ers. On this count, he concluded, "the historical record as it has
unfolded since the framing" showed an increasing receptiveness
to warrantless arrests for non-breach-of-the-peace misdemea-
nors.33 In support, Justice Souter quoted Michigan Law Profes-
sor Horace Wilgus, who observed in 1924:
The states may, by statute, enlarge the common law right to
arrest without a warrant, and have quite generally done so or
authorized municipalities to do so, as for example, an officer
may be authorized by statute or ordinance to arrest without a
warrant for various misdemeanors and violations of ordin-
ances, other than breaches of the peace, if committed in his
34
presence.
In the ensuing decades, Justice Souter observed, interest in
broadened police arrest power continued largely unabated, such
that by 2001 statutes in every American jurisdiction permitted
officers some degree of warrantless arrest authority for non
breach-of-the-peace misdemeanors.35 As a result, Atwater's was
"simply... not a case in which the claimant can point to 'a clear
Id. at 329.
3, Id. at 331 (citing Holyday v. Oxenbridge, (1631) 79 Eng. Rep. 805 (KB.)).
Id. at 337 (noting, in particular, early English statutes permitting warrantless
arrests of persons roaming the streets at night ("night-walkers")). The Court also noted
statutes from the eighteenth century and before that targeted gamblers, peddlers, va-
grants, and "negligent carriage drivers." Id. at 335.
Id. at 340-45.
Id. at 343 (quoting Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV.
541, 550 & n.54 (1924)).
Id. at 344-45, 355 app.
2009]
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answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to
by the traditions of our society ever since."'36 The Court there-
fore was obliged to "strike a current balance between individual
and societal interests.3 7
To the Atwater majority, this balance weighed in favor of
adopting a rule that, rather than turning on "sensitive, case-by-
case determinations," could be easily and readily applied by po-
lice. 8  The majority rejected Atwater's suggestion that police
arrest authority depend on whether (1) the underlying offense
carried the threat of jail time or (2) it was "necessary for en-
forcement of the traffic laws," or to halt "[an] offense [that]
would otherwise continue and pose a danger to others on the
road."39 Tying arrest authority to the gravity of the suspected
offense was untenable because it would require difficult on-the-
scene judgments about whether jail time was legally autho-
rized." Likewise, making the authority contingent on scofflaw
or otherwise dangerous offenders was problematic.41 Citing
speeding as one possible problem area, Justice Souter asked,
Is it not fair to expect that the chronic speeder will speed
again despite a citation in his pocket ... ?" Requiring police to
divine whether behavior would persist would put them in an
Id. at 345 (alteration in original) (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
"7 Id. at 346 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) and Verno-
na Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995)).
In language echoing other recent opinions of the Court endorsing similar bright-
line rules, Justice Souter characterized the need as follows:
Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in
the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of rea-
sonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied
with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years af-
ter an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable
Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government's side with an essen-
tial interest in readily administrable rules.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 347, 349 (quoting Brief of Petitioners at 46, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408), 2000 WL 1299527).
40 Id. at 348-49. Justice Souter elaborated: "It is not merely that we cannot expect
every police officer to know the details of frequently complex penalty schemes .... but
that the penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult
(if not impossible) to know at the scene of arrest." Id. (internal citations omitted).
41 Id. at 349.
42 Id.
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"almost impossible spot," and "guarantee increased litigation
over many of the arrests that would occur." In the end, Justice
Souter concluded that having the constitutionality of an arrest
hinge on such vicissitudes would create among police a "system-
ic disincentive to arrest":
An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to
warrant jail time or not quite certain about a suspect's risk of
flight would not arrest, even though it could perfectly well turn
out that, in fact, the offense called for incarceration and the de-
fendant was long gone on the day of the trial. Multiplied many
times over, the costs to society of such underenforcement could
easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly ar-
rested and booked.44
Finally, Justice Souter questioned whether warrantless
misdemeanor arrests ultimately "need constitutional atten-
tion." 5 For one thing, he reasoned, the Court's prior decisions
establish that a magistrate must review all warrantless arrests
within forty-eight hours to ensure that probable cause supports
the detention." Constitutional protection is also afforded, on a
case-by-case basis, to guard against any arrest (whether felony
or misdemeanor) that is "conducted in an extraordinary man-
ner, unusually harmful to [the citizen's] privacy or even physical
interests."" Furthermore, legislatures in several jurisdictions
had expressly limited police authority to execute warrantless
arrests for minor offenses, an alternative Justice Souter deemed
preferable to a broad constitutional rule." Statutory limits were
" Id. at 350. Justice Souter added:
It is no answer that the police routinely make judgments on grounds like risk
of immediate repetition; they surely do and should. But there is a world of dif-
ference between making that judgment in choosing between the discretionary
leniency of a summons in place of a clearly lawful arrest, and making the same
judgment when the question is the lawfulness of the warrantless arrest itself.
Id.
44 Id. at 351.
, Id. at 351-52.
Id at 352 (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55-58 (1991)).
17 Id. at 353 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
' Id. at 352. Justice Souter offered that such an approach is preferable because
"the statute can let the arrest power turn on any sort of practical consideration without
having to subsume it under a broader principle." Id.
20091
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"natural" because it is in the interest of law enforcement "to lim-
it petty-offense arrests, which carry costs that are simply too
great to incur without good reason.' 9
Justice Souter concluded by expressing confidence that such
statutory limits, "combined with the good sense (and, failing
that, the political accountability) of most local lawmakers and
law-enforcement officials," provided sufficient protection to citi-
zens." Indeed, the protection itself accounted for a "dearth of
horribles demanding redress" in the form of "foolish, warrant-
less misdemeanor arrests."51 While acknowledging that such
arrests likely occurred on occasion, Justice Souter expressed
confidence that "surely the country is not confronting anything
like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests."52 More-
over, any concern that police might utilize their expansive au-
thority to arrest, in lieu of citation, and thereby arbitrarily ha-
rass citizens, was "speculative" insofar as the record failed to
indicate that such a potential "has ever ripened into a reality."3
In sum, the Court rejected Atwater's claim that her war-
rantless arrest and detention for a fine-only offense, as permit-
ted by Texas statutory law,54 violated the Fourth Amendment.
The end result of Atwater is that "[i]f an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violat-
ing the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."55 The sole lim-
it is that the act of physical arrest itself cannot be carried out in
an "extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [the citizen's]





Id. at 354 & n.25.
See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005) (providing that a
.peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his
presence or within his view"); TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999) (provid-
ing that a "peace officer may arrest without a warrant a person found committing a
violation").
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
[VOL.79:1
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Dissenting, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Stevens, criticized the majority for affording "con-
stitutional carte blanche" to officers to arrest for any offense, no
matter how insignificant, solely on the basis of probable cause."
Justice O'Connor noted that the common law and historical
record on minor-offense warrantless arrest authority was
somewhat ambiguous," but emphasized that prior statements
by members of the Court gainsaid such authority.59 Moreover,
while the Court twenty-five years before in Watson v. United
States had held that public warrantless arrests for felonies were
justified solely on the basis of probable cause, there the histori-
cal record was far clearer and the state interest in immediate
arrest far greater.60 Finally, while the Court's 1996 decision in
Whren v. United States approved of probable cause-based war-
rantless stops of motorists regardless of the subjective (perhaps
pretextual) motivation of police, Atwater had been subject to a
full custodial arrest.6' "Justifying a full [custodial] arrest by the
same quantum of evidence that justifies a traffic stop-even
though the offender cannot ultimately be imprisoned for her
conduct-defies any sense of proportionality and is in serious
Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 362-63 (stating that the "Court's thorough exegesis makes it abundantly
clear that warrantless misdemeanor arrests were not the subject of a clear and consis-
tently applied rule at common law"). To scholars, most notably Professor Tom Davies,
the framing era record is not so ambiguous, quite clearly evincing the limited warrant-
less arrest authority of law enforcement. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Charac-
ter of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of
Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239
(2002).
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 238 n.2 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). The majority's exclusive probable
cause-based standard also conflicted with several of the Court's prior decisions linking
the reasonableness of police seizures to the gravity of the offense involved. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336 (2001) (upholding seizure of resident because
offense was "jailable"); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (invalidating in-
home warrantless arrest because offense was "nonjailable").
' Atwater, 532 U.S. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Watson v. United
States, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)).
6 Id. at 363 (noting that "[there are significant qualitative differences between a
traffic stop and a full custodial arrest.").
20091
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tension with the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreason-
able seizures." 2
Given the perceived ambiguous nature of the historical and
precedential record, Justice O'Connor then engaged in balanc-
ing analysis, much like the majority. Rather than deferring to
the avowed administrative benefits of a bright-line rule in eva-
luating reasonableness, however, Justice O'Connor expressed
alarm over the ramifications of affording police unfettered dis-
cretionary authority to arrest for minor offenses. She first cata-
logued the major personal consequences of custodial arrests,
including detention in a holding facility for up to forty-eight
hours without judicial certification that the arrest was sup-
ported by probable cause; the embarrassment and potential
danger attending detention;' and the social stigma associated
with having an arrest record.65 She then highlighted the range
of critically important investigatory powers tied to the occur-
rence of lawful arrests, such as the automatic right to search of
the body and possessions of arrestees,66 and the passenger com-
partment and any containers therein if the arrestee is driving a
67car.
In order to justify such a "severe intrusion on an individu-
al's liberty," Justice O'Connor reasoned, the governmental need
must be substantial. 8 However, in the context of fine-only of-
fenses, this need was manifestly modest and sufficiently served
by the less onerous alternative of a citation. Given the availa-
bility of citations, Justice O'Connor reasoned, it betrayed rea-
sonableness to endorse a bright-line rule that "deems a full cus-
todial arrest to be reasonable in every circumstance" solely be-
cause the officer had probable cause to believe that a violation
occurred.69 Such an approach defied the Fourth Amendment
62 Id. at 364.
Id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991)).
Id. (citing Rosazza & Cook, Jail Intake: Managing a Critical Function-Part One:
Resources, 13 AM. JAILS 35 (MarJApr. 1999)).
' Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976)).
Id. at 364 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
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requirement that a police action be a "reasonable and propor-
tional response to the circumstances of the offense," instead giv-
ing police "unfettered discretion" to execute custodial arrests
"without articulating a single reason why such action is appro-
priate.""0
In place of the majority's bright-line rule, Justice O'Connor
advocated a case-by-case constitutional analysis modeled on
Terry v. Ohio: when an officer has probable cause to believe that
a fine-only offense has been committed, the officer "should issue
a citation unless the officer is 'able to point to specific and arti-
culable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion'
of a full custodial arrest."7' To Justice O'Connor, such a rule
would be only modestly less clear and bright than that imposed
by the majority, in that it would merely require "a legitimate
reason for the decision to escalate the seizure into a full scale
custodial arrest."72 Furthermore, whatever the option lacked in
categorical quality and administrability, it compensated for "in
fidelity to the Fourth Amendment's command of reasonableness
and sensitivity to the competing values protected by that
Amendment."73 As for the majority's concern over purported
"systematic disincentives" associated with potential civil rights
actions for false arrest, Justice O'Connor observed that qualified
immunity largely served to insulate against the threat of ac-
tionable civil rights claims, and, at any rate, to the extent arrest
disincentives were operative, they did not free the Court to "ig-
nore the central [reasonableness] command of the Fourth
Amendment."74
Applying her Terry-based test, Justice O'Connor concluded
that neither "law nor reason" supported Turek's decision to ar-
rest Atwater. 5 Atwater, a mother of two who had lived in the
area for sixteen years, and whose only previous violation-
failing to signal a lane change while driving-occurred ten years
7o Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 366 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
72 Id.
73 Id.




earlier, immediately accepted responsibility and apologized to
Turek for her misbehavior. 6 It was thus likely that she thereaf-
ter would have complied with the seat belt law, and be available
for a court appearance if necessary, making a citation a tenable
and less restrictive option.77 Justice O'Conner further noted
that custodial arrest also failed to serve the interests of Atwa-
ter's two young children.78 Turek's decision to arrest Atwater
traumatized the children, leaving them distraught and fearful of
police.79 Instead of serving as a lesson in legal responsibility, as
would be achieved by a citation, the arrest "taught the children
an entirely different lesson: that the bad person could just as
easily be the policeman as it could be the most horrible person
they could imagine."' Justice O'Connor added that Turek's ac-
tions were "disproportionate" to Atwater's wrongdoing and that
"[tihe majority's assessment that 'Atwater's claim to live free of
pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything
the City can raise against it specific to her case,' is quite correct.
In my view, the Fourth Amendment inquiry ends there."'
Finally, Justice O'Connor turned her sights to the broader
implications of the majority's bright-line rule. While govern-
ments surely should be free to enact public welfare-related laws
punishable only by fine,8 providing police categorical authority
to arrest for their violation carried "grave potential for abuse,"
particularly because the Court's prior decision in Whren v. Unit-
ed States rendered constitutionally irrelevant the subjective mo-
tivations of police.8 3 "After [the majority's decision]," O'Connor
observed, "the arsenal available to any officer extends to a full
arrest and the searches permissible concomitant to that ar-
rest."4 To Justice O'Connor, precisely because the subjective
motivations of police cannot now be considered, the Court must




Id. (internal quotations omitted).
8, Id. at 371 (quotingAtwater, 532 U.S. at 347 (majority opinion)).
Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 372 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
Id.
[VOL.79:1
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"vigilantly ensure" that police behaviors--"which are properly
within our reach-comport with the Fourth Amendment's guar-
antee of reasonableness.""
II. THE "EPIDEMIC"
Before considering the jurisprudential and practical effects
of Atwater, it is important to discuss two empirical matters that
undergird the majority's decision and were rightly disputed by
Justice O'Connor. First, the majority downplayed the need for
constitutional regulation of warrantless arrest authority out of a
belief that police naturally lack incentive to arrest for minor
violations because they "carry costs too great to incur without
good reason." 6 As Justice O'Connor suggested, however, the
majority's sense of police motivation was at best naive.87 Be-
cause arrests serve as triggering events justifying an array of
attendant police powers, most notably searches incident to ar-
rest,8 police have strong incentive to arrest for minor offenses in
the hope of securing evidence of more serious crimes (typically,
illegal drug or weapon possession).
Second, the majority insisted that constitutional oversight
was not needed because the nation was "not confronting any-
thing like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests."8 9
In support, the majority pointed out that Atwater's counsel at
oral argument was able to identify only one other instance "of
comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor arrests,"9" serving
to confirm that "there simply is no evidence of widespread abuse
of minor-offense arrest authority," and that counsel's posited
"'potential for abuse" had not "ripened into a reality."'
Again, Justice O'Connor justly disputed the majority's as-
sertions. As a threshold matter, she questioned the majority's
fixation on the purported "relatively small number of published
Id.
Id. at 321 (majority opinion).
Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (majority opinion).
Id.
9o Id.
' Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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cases," noting that it "proves little and should provide little so-
lace."92 It has long been known that paucity of published (and
for that matter unpublished) case law is a poor barometer of the
actual existence of events.9" This is perhaps especially so with
street-level searches and seizures based on minor offenses, a
context particularly conducive to "invisible" practices,94 due to
the effort and expense associated with constitutional litigation95
and the natural disincentive to pursue a claim when no long-
term deprivation of liberty is at stake.96 Moreover, minor-
offense arrest data, as noted by Atwater's counsel in an unsuc-
cessful petition for rehearing, very likely significantly unders-
tate the frequency of such arrests, for two chief reasons.9 v First,
minor offense arrests are often not recorded as such if a search,
conditioned upon the arrest, resulted in discovery of contraband
or evidence of a more serious crime.98 Second, the data fail to
reflect instances when police "unarrest" individuals-that is,
I ld.
Id. For an early yet still apt recognition of this, see Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that "invasion of the personal
liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress," and that "[t]here may be, and
I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches ... of innocent people which
turn up nothing incriminating..."). See also, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
121 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Because we are called on to decide whether evi-
dence should be excluded only when a search has been 'successful,' it is easy to forget
that the standards we announce determine what government conduct is reasonable in
searches and seizures directed at persons who turn out to be innocent as well as those
who are guilty. I continue to believe that ungrudging application of the Fourth Amend-
ment is indispensable to preserving the liberties of a democratic society.").
' See, e.g., Caleb Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the Law of Arrest,
52 Nw. U. L. REV. 16, 20-21 (1957); Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Con-
temporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 359-62 (1936).
Gail Atwater qualified as a notable exception in this regard. She sued solely to
vindicate what she saw as her Fourth Amendment right, not to suppress evidence unco-
vered by police in a search incident to arrest. Atwater and her husband, a physician,
sold their home and incurred legal costs in excess of $100,000. Atwater told one report-
er: "If someone like me, a soccer mom, can be humiliated and handcuffed in front of her
children, what happens to the poor migrant worker or minority when they're stopped?"
Milloy, supra note 13, at A9.
' See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(noting that "invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical
redress. There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches...
of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating....").
w Petition for Rehearing at 4-5, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408) (providing data
on traffic-related arrests in several states).
N Id.
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police conduct a search ostensibly based on an arrest for a minor
offense, find no evidence or contraband resulting in a more se-
rious prosecution, and release an individual with a mere cita-
tion or warning."
In any event, even if one were to accept the majority's cu-
rious notion that a constitutional violation is acceptable merely
because it rarely occurs, 1° the majority's empirical premise was
clearly incorrect. Ample evidence existed at the time of Atwater
of a profusion of "very minor offense" arrests, triggering incident
searches resulting in more serious criminal prosecutions. For
instance, state and lower federal courts condoned warrantless
arrests, and searches incident thereto, for myriad minor auto
and non-auto-related offenses, including:
illegal parking;'0 ' littering;
0 2 riding a bicycle on a sidewalk
1 °0
or without a headlight; °4 civil contempt (based on a civil bench.105 • . 106 107 1 0
warrant); juvenile curfew violation; truancy; speeding;'
driving with a broken taillight;' °9 possessing drug parapherna-
lia;"0 violating an alcohol open container law;"' public drink-* 112113
ing;112 underage possession of alcohol; " "pedestrian interfe-
" Id.
Indeed, the rarity of minor offense arrests, if accurate, itself can be said to heigh-
ten their Fourth Amendment unreasonableness. Cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
596-97 (1977) (citing paucity of jury death verdicts imposed on defendants convicted of
rape as evidence supporting the view that the death penalty in such situations violates
the Eighth Amendment).
"o Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
United States v. Herring, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Or. 1999); State v. Sparks, 422
S.E.2d 293 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Ranson, 511 N.W.2d 97 (Neb. 1994); People v.
Whitted, 718 N.Y.S.2d 162 (City Ct. 2000).
' United States v. McFadden, 238 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying New York law).
'" United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Iowa law).
People v. Allibalogun, 727 N.E.2d 633 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
" In re Charles C., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Ct. App. 1999); In re J.M., 995 S.W.2d 838
(Tex. App. 1999).
"7 In re Humberto 0., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (Ct. App. 2000); State ex rel. R.D., 749 So.
2d 802 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
08 United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Utah law); Kearse
v. State, 986 S.W.2d 423 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999).
"' State v. Hehman, 544 P.2d 1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
.. State v. Thompson, 104 Wash. App. 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
"' People v. Pantusco, 484 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1985); State v. Pallone, 613
N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2000).
.2 State v. Thompson, 536 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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rence"; '14 urinating in public; 5 and possessing a suspended
driver's license while operating a bicycle (on reasoning that the
document permitted misidentification).
1 6
Since Atwater, courts have cited the majority's decision to
uphold arrests (and incidental searches) for a litany of minor
offenses, again very often based on municipal ordinances,117 in-
cluding:
walking in a roaway;" possessing an open container of alco-
hol in public;" 9 driving with an expired vehicle registration
120 121 122sticker; making an illegal turn while driving; jaywalking;
driving a car with a non-working headlight;' 2 driving a carS 124
with a hole in the car's license plate; riding a bicycle the
wrong direction on a residential street12 or without a head-
light;' 26 public urination; 1 27  driving a bike against traffic; 2
Commonwealth v. Moscat, 731 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
State v. Greene, 983 P.2d 1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
,'5 Commonwealth v. Williams, 568 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); McConnell v.
State, No. 14-99-00887-CR, 2001 WL 8344 (Tex. App. Jan. 4, 2001).
"' Caraballo v. State, 753 So. 2d 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). For examples of pre-
Atwater judicial invalidation of warrantless minor offense arrests, as constitutionally
unreasonable, see Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197 (D.C. 1987) (jaywalking);
Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993) (riding a bicycle without a bell); State v.
Carver, 577 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (speeding).
... For a discussion of the significant power of municipal governments to enact laws
enforceable by state, local and federal officers, see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Crimi-
nal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001).
... Collins v. State, No. 14-00-00814-CR, 2001 WL 664644 (Tex. Ct. App. June 14,
2001).
.. People v. Lopez, No. HO24173, 2003 WL 21942954 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2003);
State v. Roche, 928 So. 2d 761 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
"2 Nicholson v. State, No. 05-00-01401-CR, 2001 WL 515919 (Tex. Ct. App. May 16,
2001).
... People v. Fennell, No. B144396, 2001 WL 1190768 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2001).
'= United States v. Pratt, 355 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Missouri law);
State v. Barros, 48 P.3d 584 (Haw. 2002); State v. Brown, No. 18972, 2001 WL 1657828
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001).
State v. Wilkenson, 769 N.E.2d 430 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2001).
People v. Lambert, No. D052435, 2009 WL 1091704 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59 (Cal. 2002).
' Brown v. State, No. 13-05-243-CR, 2006 WL 2025145 (Tex. App., July 20, 2006).
State v. Mercante, 836 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
People v. Bybee, No. B171855, 2004 WL 1689782 (Cal. Ct. App. July 29, 2004).
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and violating a city ordinance for remaining in a public park
after hours. 
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At the same time, courts have invoked Atwater to bar civil
rights actions based on arrests for very minor offenses, without
searches, as condoned in Atwater, 30 which in conjunction with
data showing that most misdemeanor arrests do not result in
prosecution,13 ' raises serious question whether police rarely
resort to "unnecessary" minor offense arrests.
The judicial and empirical record thus readily contradicts
the presumption that afforded constitutional solace to the Atwa-
ter majority. In a case decided shortly after Atwater in the
2000-2001 Term, involving a car inventory stemming from an
arrest for several minor vehicle-related offenses, Justice
O'Connor and the three other Atwater dissenters concurred on
" Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying New Mexico law);
Hudson v. State, No. CACROO-1013, 2001 WL 541069 (Ark. Ct. App. May 23, 2001).
" See, e.g., Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2009) (unpaid parking
tickets); Lorenzo v. City of Tampa, 259 Fed. App'x 239 (11th Cir. 2007) (illegally distri-
buting handbills); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2007) (double parking
vehicle); Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2005) (being in a municipal park
after closing); Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2004) (illegally sell-
ing tickets); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (noise ordinance); Lowe v.
Spears, No. 3:06-0647, 2009 WL 1393860 (S.D. W. Va. May 15, 2009) (parking violation);
Revely v. City of Huntington, No. 3:07-0648, 2009 WL 1097972 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 23,
2009) (failure to stop a car parallel with a stop sign); Hitto v. City of Murphy, No. 4:08-
cv-221, 2009 WL 801772 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2009) (running a stop sign while driving a
bicycle); Shipp v. Bucher, No. 8:07-cv-440-T-17TBM, 2009 WL 179668 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
26, 2009) (public disposal of lighted material (cigarette)); Wasserman v. Rodacker, No.
06-1005 (RWR), 2007 WL 2071649 (D.D.C. July 18, 2007) (walking dogs without a
leash); Sands v. City of New York, No. CV 04 5275 BMC CLP, 2006 WL 2850613
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2006) (littering); Holloman v. City of Myrtle Beach, No. 4:04-1868,
2006 WL 4869353 (D.S.C. June 8, 2006) (following a police car too closely (1.5 lengths));
Bennett v. Booth, No. Civ. A. 3:04-1322, 2005 WL 2211371 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 9, 2005)
(unlawful display of a "Friends of Police" emblem on car).
"' See Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59
MD. L. REV. 1, 46 (2000) (discussing data showing that majority of state misdemeanor
arrests do not ultimately result in prosecution). Aggregate arrest data (while likely
understated, for reasons noted) indicate the high frequency of arrests based on minor
offenses. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbls. 4.1, 4.7 (Ann
L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire, eds., 2007),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost 4.html (noting millions of minor offense-based
arrests, exclusive of non-DUI traffic violations); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from
Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 280-90 (2009) (examining huge volume of minor
offense arrests in New York City).
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stare decisis grounds,'32 but expressed "hope" -that the majority
would reconsider its holding in Atwater "if experience demon-
strates 'anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense
arrests."' 33 Unfortunately, this reconsideration, based on what
Justice Brandeis called the "lessons of experience," has not been
forthcoming.' As a result, with probable cause serving as the
sine qua non of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, both visible
and invisible arrests-and searches-have occurred without
meaningful constitutional limit. 3' This expanded arrest power
has major personal consequences for individuals, as noted by
Justice O'Connor, and has assumed added significance with re-
cent initiatives to extract and retain DNA samples from all ar-
restees, not solely from persons convicted of crimes."'
Finally, Justice O'Connor's insistence on the need for a con-
stitutional limit, rather than relying on what the majority con-
sidered the lack of police incentive to arrest and the "good sense
(and, failing that, the political accountability) of most local
lawmakers and law-enforcement officials,"'37 has been validated
by subsequent events. Faith that the political process can curb
undue police practices, voiced again by the Court in Herring v.
United States,'35 has proven unjustified.9 Notably, in the wake
... Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772-73 (2001) (applying Arkansas law).
13 Id. at 773 (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001)).
13 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
13 The Court's recent decision in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) holds some
promise of mitigating the breadth of search incident to arrest authority, at least relative
to auto-related stops. In Gant, the Court held that an auto interior search is justified
only when "the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest" Id. at 1723. The Gant majority stated that "[iun many cases, as when
a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to
believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence." Id. at 1719. The "reasonable basis to
believe" standard, however, would appear to be a lesser quantum than probable cause,
likely serving to limit the effect of the Court's statement.
'" See Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expanding Databases of DNA, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at Al.
... Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009). The Court's view is strikingly reminiscent of that
expressed in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949), where Justice Frankfurter opined
that "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion"
would obviate the need for a judicially imposed constitutional limit. However, the view
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of Atwater, Texas itself considered enacting a statutory limit on
the warrantless arrest authority of police with regard to minor
motor vehicle offenses, emulating the laws in several jurisdic-
tions approvingly cited by the majority.4 ' However, the bill
failed to secure gubernatorial approval.' With the strong sup-
port of law enforcement groups, Governor Rick Perry stated that
"[p]eace officers should retain their existing authority to use
their discretion to arrest for a traffic violation."'42
Moreover, the targets of such discretionary exercises of po-
lice authority will not only resemble self-described soccer moms
such as Gail Atwater, who was very nearly relegated to the poor
house as a result of her litigation.' Rather, what Justice
O'Connor termed "constitutional carte blanche"'44 extends to all
individuals suspected of committing minor offenses, a domain in
which police enjoy maximum latitude to exercise discretionary
arrest authority.'4 ' In this camp one will surely find the politi-
cally disempowered, disproportionately persons of color, whose
voices are either muted or not heeded by elected officials, or
quite possibly, out-of-state visitors whom the police can target
with political impunity.
46
was gainsaid twelve years later in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961), when the
Court felt the need to impose the exclusionary sanction on the states.
" Cf. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1329 (1998) (noting "breakdowns at the legislative and the discre-
tionary institutional level that are mutually reinforcing").
" Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352 (citing examples and noting that "[i]t is of course easier
to devise a minor-offense limitation by statue than to derive one through the Constitu-
tion").
"' Michele Deitch, Veto Risks Texans' Civil Rights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 1,
2001, at 5J.
"' Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte
Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419,448 (2002) (citation omitted).
,' See Milloy, supra note 13.
... Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., James Walsh & Dan Browning, Presumed Guilty Until Proved Innocent,
STARTRIBUNE (Minneapolis), July 23, 2000, at 1A (noting significantly higher warrant-
less arrest rates for African-Americans with regard to a broad array of minor offenses);
see also David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response
to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1083 (1999) ("The problem
with discretionary authority . . .is that discretion permits law enforcement to target
those whose complaints are least likely to be heard by the rest of the community.").
" Such a prospect was noted by Justice Stevens in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998), where the Court invalidated a police officer's search incident to issuance of a
citation. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (No. 97-
20091 133
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Justice O'Connor's insistence on a constitutional limit is
further justified given the Court's recent decision in Virginia v.
Moore.147 Making ample use of Atwater as precedent, the Moore
Court held that state statutory limits on police discretionary
arrest authority for minor offenses were immaterial for Fourth
Amendment purposes.' In Moore, police arrested a motorist in
flagrant defiance of a Virginia law that limited custodial arrests
to specified instances, such as when the violator refuses to dis-
continue the offense.'49 The arresting officer stated that execut-
ing an arrest instead of issuing a citation for driving with a sus-
pended license was his "prerogative."" ° He thereafter conducted
a search and discovered crack cocaine in Moore's vehicle, which
ultimately led to Moore's conviction for possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute.'' Invoking Atwater's "probable cause
standard" and re-asserting the absence of any "epidemic" of
"horribles" that compels redress, the Moore Court stated:
[A]n arrest based on probable cause serves interests that have
long been seen as sufficient to justify the seizure .... A State
is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range
of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more
restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones un-
reasonable, and hence unconstitutional.
5 2
With Moore, the Court thus dashed the lingering hope of di-
rect legislative redress for the exercise of unreasonable discre-
tionary arrest authority of police, using Atwater's substitute of
probable cause for reasonableness as constitutional justifica-
tion.' As Moore and Atwater in tandem make clear, constitu-
7597), 1998 WL 781827 (observing that Iowa police might save the strategy of arresting
rather than ticketing "for out-of-state motorists").
147 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
' Id. at 1604-07; see also id. at 1609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
149 Id. at 1602.
Joint Appendix at 15, Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2007) (No. 06-1082).
" Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1602.
12 Id. at 1606.
" See id. at 1604 (noting that "when an officer has probable cause to believe a per-
son committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public
interests is not in doubt .... The arrest is constitutionally reasonable."); see also id. at
1608 ("When officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime
in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to
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tional reasonableness turns solely on probable cause that a
substantive law was violated, irrespective of whether a jurisdic-
tion procedurally authorizes (Atwater) or prohibits (Moore) ar-
rest for its violation. As a result, warrantless arrests for minor
offenses have continued unabated. '54
Ultimately, the Atwater majority's understanding of both
police motivation and the incidence of minor offense arrests
stems from a basic confidence in the equitable use by police of
their discretionary authority. As Ronald Dworkin once noted,
however, "[d]iscretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not ex-
ist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restric-
tion."' 55 With Atwater, this "belt," long supported by judicial
sensitivity to police abuses of discretionary authority' 6 and dec-
ades of research,"' has essentially ceased to exist.
search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety."). Atwa-
ter-decided in 2001-served as the anchor of the Moore Court's reference to the "long
line" of cases equating probable cause with constitutional reasonableness, the historical
verity of which was justly questioned by Justice Ginsburg in her Moore concurrence.
Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1608-09 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
" In the future, such arrests may not be limited to non-breach-of-the-peace offenses
occurring "in the presence" of arresting officers. The Atwater majority expressly dis-
claimed the need to address whether the accepted common law requirement enjoyed
constitutional status, seeing no need to "speculate" on the question, presumably because
Turek witnessed Atwater's seatbelt violation. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 340 n.11 (2001). However, the majority signaled its view that the requirement is
not of Fourth Amendment stature, citing to a prior comment to this effect by Justice
White. Id. (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., dissenting)).
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977).
' Such concern was perhaps most famously evinced by Justice Robert Jackson's
assertion that search and seizure authority should not be left only to "the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." United States v. John-
son, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). For similar acknowledgements in later years see, for exam-
ple, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 614 (1961). See also Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, The Police, and the
Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 238, 241 (1966) (observing that
the judiciary was "unconvinced that the police regard the rights of the accused as any-
thing but a nuisance and an impediment").
... See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965); see also ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, at 180-81 (1989)
(quoting a local city judge, alarmed at the increasing resort by police to arrest for minor
offenses, who demanded that they cease their "constant habit of arresting parties in
order to search them.").
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III. THE PERILS OF POSITIVIST POLICING
By equating probable cause with constitutional reasonable-
ness, Justice O'Connor correctly observed, the Atwater majority
freed police to invoke minor offenses as bases for arrest, permit-
ting the widespread "'pointless indignity" suffered by lawbreak-
ers such as Gail Atwater'58 and the "grave potential for abuse"
associated with unfettered discretionary arrest authority. 9 The
myriad of substantive offenses today codified in state, federal,
and local government codes, have become, in the wake of Atwa-
ter, tools for the exercise of discretionary police arrest authority.
The Court itself has refused to regulate these tools, eschewing
imposition of limits on possibly "exorbitant codes"16° for purposes
of police enforcement, and rejecting, as Virginia v. Moore estab-
lished, any federal constitutional limiting effect of cognate state
procedural limits on police arrest authority. 6'
Because police officers take oaths to enforce the law, the
Court's insistence that their arrest authority be based on a sus-
pected violation of positive law should come as no surprise. In-
deed, as Justice O'Connor emphasized, governments clearly act
within their rights when they legislate pursuant to their police
power authority, including malum prohibitum offenses.'62 How-
ever, as she also noted, not all laws should be the same relative
to police discretionary arrest authority. This part examines
several important consequences of the Atwater majority's deci-
sion to make constitutional reasonableness turn on probable
cause that an offense, no matter how menial, has occurred.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 371 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 372.
o Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996). See also Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (specifying a
"basic principle of the Fourth Amendment: that law enforcement officials can enforce
with the same vigor all rules and regulations irrespective of the perceived importance of
any of those rules") (citing Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347).
,' See supra notes 147-154 and accompanying text. For discussion of the risks asso-
ciated with decoupling substantive laws from their accompanying procedural limits, see
Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in Government". Federal Recourse to State Law in
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 74-75 (2006).
" Atwater, 532 U.S. at 371-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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A. "Law in the Air "1
The Texas law at issue in Atwater, penalizing a motorist's
failure to wear a seat belt-resulting in a fine-is representa-
tive of countless state, local, and federal laws targeting similar
misconduct of a relatively non-serious nature.6 4  In Atwater,
only a single law was implicated. Three years later, in Deven-
peck v. Alford, 6' the Court made clear that the greater the num-
ber of laws potentially at play, the greater the likelihood that an
arrest will be deemed constitutionally valid.
In Alford, police arrested an individual because he was be-
lieved to be tape recording a traffic stop in violation of state pri-
vacy laws. After a determination that Alford's behavior was in
actuality not illegal, the charges against him were dismissed.166
Thereafter, prosecutors filed new legally actionable charges,
based on the arresting officer's subsequent contention that
probable cause existed at the time to support arrest for other
offenses not initially identified by the arresting officer (e.g., im-
personating a police officer).'67 The Court unanimously held the
new grounds of arrest were constitutionally reasonable, even
though not "closely related" to the alleged misconduct serving as
the initial basis for arrest.6 8 Probable cause that a legal viola-
tion occurred, "drawn from the facts known to the arresting of-
ficer," even if based on ex post legal extrapolations of the entire
legal code, can thus constitutionally validate an arrest.'69 An
officer's "subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the
criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable
cause."7 ° So long as probable cause exists that some offense oc-
curred, an arrest is constitutionally reasonable, even if the legal
" With a hat tip of course to Justice Cardozo who alternatively argued that "negli-
gence in the air," absent proof of violation of a legal norm, will not suffice to create tort
liability. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.).
See supra notes 101-130 and accompanying text.
543 U.S. 146 (2004).
' Id. at 149-51.
'" Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 155-56.
'" Id. at 152. The court added, "[Tihose are lawfully arrested whom the facts known
to the arresting officers give probable cause to arrest." Id. at 155.
0 Id. at 153.
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basis is not specified, or indeed, if the basis initially specified
turns out to lack legal justification.
Atwater and Alford, 7' together with Moore's disregard of
procedural limits on police arrest authority, have empowered
police to use any law, at any time, and any place,'72 to justify
arrests, and hence searches.'73 Given the heavily regulated na-
ture of modern society, especially relative to motor vehicles, 74
... For examples of recent decisions expressly combining Alford and Atwater, see
Brown v. Fisher, 251 Fed. App'x. 527 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying Kansas law); Apodca v.
City of Albuquerque, 443 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying New Mexico law); Tatum
v. City of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying California law); United
States v. McNeill, 484 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Maryland law). For examples
of earlier courts deploying Atwater to reach results later also authorized by Alford, see
Williams v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Illinois law); People v.
Bybee, No. B171855, 2004 WL 1689782 (Cal. Ct. App. July 29, 2004).
It warrants mention that Alford potentially builds on language in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), which suggested that information possessed by other officers
can augment and rehabilitate infirm probable cause assessments by arresting officers.
See id. at 923 n.24 ("References to 'officer' throughout this opinion should not be read too
narrowly. It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers
who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or
who provided information material to the probable-cause determination."); see also
Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) (recognizing the "collective knowledge" doc-
trine).
" See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (10' Cir. 2009) (apply-
ing Colorado law and, citing Atwater and Moore, holding that jurisdictional geographic
limits on police arrest authority have no bearing on constitutionality of arrest).
"' The Court's recent decision in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), presents
an interesting question vis-a-vis Alford. As noted earlier, the Court imposed new limits
on police search incident to arrest authority, deeming an automobile search justified
only when "the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest." Id. at 1723 (emphasis added). Alford's bearing on the latter considera-
tion remains to be seen when, for example, the initial basis for arrest leads an officer to
reasonably believe the car contains relevant evidence, but the substantive legal basis for
the arrest itself (as in Alford) is later deemed invalid.
... See Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from Start to Finish: Too Much
"Routine," Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1853 (2004) (noting
that "very few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without violating some
traffic regulation"). Atwater's application in the auto context, as Professor Dave Moran
has astutely observed, can function to moot the Court's case law limiting police road-
blocks. See David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and
Search Any Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 832 (2002) ('If an officer may stop
any car she observes committing any traffic or equipment violation, arrest the motorist
and search the car, there is no need to set up roadblocks. Indeed, it would obviously be
much more efficient and productive for the police to single out 'suspicious' motorists,
[and] stop and arrest them for trivial violations .... ").
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the power is manifestly far greater than that enjoyed by fram-
ing era police.'75
B. "Could have Arrested" Authority
Atwater's positivist orientation has encouraged and fortified
another feature of modern street-level policing: the "could have
arrested" authority. The question of whether an actual arrest is
necessary to justify an incidental search would appear to have
been settled by several of the Court's prior decisions. In par-
ticular, in Cupp v. Murphy76 the Court stated:
Where there is no formal arrest, as in the case before us, a per-
son might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to
take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating
evidence on his person. Since he knows he is going to be re-
leased, he might likely be instead to be concerned with divert-
ing attention away from himself.
177
Similarly, the Court's unanimous 1998 decision in Knowles
v. Iowa, prohibiting police from conducting searches incident to
issuance of a citation, was clearly predicated on the occurrence
of an actual arrest.178  Even though Iowa law expressly autho-
rized arrest (as in Atwater) for a speeding offense, the fact that
the officer did not arrest Knowles-but rather merely issued a
citation-rendered the ensuing search unconstitutional. 179 Tak-
" As Professor Tom Davies has convincingly shown, during the framing era the ex
parte warrantless arrest authority of police, such as it existed, was very limited. Tho-
mas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547
(1999). The limited authority stemmed inter alia from the requirement that an offense
have been committed "in fact." Id. at 651. "[The] common law required that arrest or
search warrants had to be based on an allegation of an offense or theft 'in fact' as well as
'probable cause of suspicion' as to a particular person to be arrested or place to be
searched." Id. at 703; see also Davies, supra note 58, at 301-26.
176 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
... Id. at 296. The Court did, however, allow admission of incriminating evidence
found pursuant to what it termed a "very limited search," one "necessary to preserve the
highly evanescent evidence [police] found under [the suspect's] fingernails." Id.
525 U.S. 113 (1998).
Id. at 118-19. Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court's contrary decision below express-
ly relied on the "could have" approach, based on its prior decision in State v. Doran, 563
N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1997). According to Doran, search-incident authority:
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en together, Cupp and Knowles, along with the Court's several
landmark search-incident cases, in which arrests indisputably
occurred, 8 ° make clear that an actual arrest must occur before a
search is authorized-not merely that probable cause to arrest
existed.'""
[Is dependent upon facts that provide a legal basis for making a custodial ar-
rest rather than the act of arrest itself....
... We have adopted an objective or "could" assessment of the arresting offic-
er's conduct in making the arrest "so long as the officer is legally permitted
and objectively authorized to do so, an arrest is constitutional."
S.. If the officer is legally permitted and objectively authorized to make the ar-
rest, he is, for that reason alone, also authorized to make the search.
Id. at 622-23 (citation omitted). Expressing a sentiment strikingly prescient of the rami-
fications of Atwater itself, Justice Neuman wrote in dissent:
It is, indeed, expedient .. .to enhance the power of police officers.... But
the sweep of today's opinion will also sacrifice the personal privacy of "soccer
moms" driving a little too fast to the ball field, senior citizens motoring along
without a taillight, and otherwise "good kids" who fail to dim their high beams
swiftly enough. All will be subject to search at the whim of the officer, not be-
cause they will be taken into custody, but because they could have been.
Id. at 624 (Neuman, J., dissenting).
," See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Furthermore, a basic as-
sumption of search-incident doctrine is that a search is justified because of the incidence
of an actual arrest. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (stating that a "container may, of course,
be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that
the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest
justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have"); Robinson, 414
U.S. at 235 (stating that an "arrest of a suspect.., is a reasonable intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment," and 'that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification").
"' As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed, the Court's decision in United
States v. Robinson:
[M]ade clear that it is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the au-
thority to undertake an extensive search for weapons and evidence of a crime.
The actual making of a formal arrest, as opposed to the mere existence of
grounds for doing so, is considered to be a significant event. The lawful arrest
is not a mere formality, and without an arrest there is no justification for a full
search incident to an arrest.
State v. Swanson, 475 N.W.2d 148, 154 (Wis. 1991) (citation omitted). See also State v.
Pallone, 613 N.W.2d 568, 577 (Wis. 2000) ("For the search incident to arrest exception to
apply, there must be an arrest .... The requirement of an arrest is a 'bright line rule')
(quoting Knowles, 525 U.S. at 113,117-18 (1998)); HARVEY CORTLAND VORHEES, THE
LAW OF ARREST IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS § 209, at 173 (2d ed. 1915) (stating 'an
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Nevertheless, the case law contains numerous instances of
state and lower federal courts endorsing the "could have ar-
rested" doctrine. Before Atwater, this tendency was common
enough,' both raising constitutional concern and stunting de-
velopment of the law of arrest.'83
Predictably, Atwater, with its probable cause-based consti-
tutional standard, has fostered proliferation of the view,' even
though probable cause is neither susceptible of precise under-
standing"8 5 nor hard to satisfy9.' Courts have also used the ra-
officer has no right to search a person and seize anything upon him unless he has first
arrested him").
,' See, e.g., United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[Tlhe fact that
[the officer] had cause to arrest appellant for speeding, even if he initially determined
not to do so, was a sufficient predicate for a full search."); Commonwealth v. Mantinez,
692 N.E.2d 92, 96 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998) ("Probable cause for an arrest, even if not acted
upon by a formal arrest, brings with it the 'search incident to arrest' exception to the
warrant requirement for a search.") (citing Commonwealth v. Brillante, 399 Mass. 152,
155 n. 6 (1987)); State v. Roach, 452 N.W.2d 262, 266 (Neb. 1990) ("It is not necessary
that an actual formal arrest occur before a search is undertaken, as long as probable
cause for arrest does exist"); State v. Greenslit, 559 A.2d 672, 674 (Vt. 1989) ("[Ilt is the
existence of probable cause for the arrest which brings the search within constitutional
limits, not merely the act of taking the individual into custody.").
" This underdevelopment stands in stark contrast to the rich jurisprudence con-
cerning when a suspect is in "custody" for Miranda purposes and when a "de facto" ar-
rest occurs (as opposed to a Terry stop) requiring probable cause. See Thomas K. Clan-
cy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What is a "Seizure" of a
Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619 (1999)
(discussing distinctions between de facto arrests and stops); Anne Bowen Poulin, The
Fourth Amendment: Elusive Standards; Elusive Review, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 138
n.76 (1991) (noting that "post-Miranda cases dwell on the definitions of custody and
interrogation"). As a result, what Richard Uviller has called the "magical moment of
arrest" has largely been mooted, disabling development of an important aspect of Fourth
Amendment law. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED
PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA 28 (1996). See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1, at 2 (4th ed. 2004) (noting
that "[lit is often important to determine whether or not the police have made an arrest
and, if they have, precisely when the arrest occurred").
'" See, e.g., United States v. Pratt, 355 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying
Missouri law and citing Atwater in support); People v. Branner, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 272,
276 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Atwater in support).
" See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (noting that probable cause is a
"fluid" concept "not readily.., reduced to a neat set of legal rules"); Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (noting difficulty in articulating "precisely what [proba-
ble cause] means"). In addition, of late the Court has haphazardly conflated probable
cause with ostensibly lesser standards relating to reasonableness. See, e.g., Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (stating that "[tihe substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt").
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL.79:1
tionale to justify otherwise impermissible delays in auto stops181
because under Atwater police could have executed an arrest.
188
The persuasive appeal of the doctrine is so potent as to redeem
searches when police have issued a citation before undertaking
a search, an outcome contrary to Knowles v. Iowa,"9 again pre-
dicated on the argument that because police could have arrested
they were entitled to search.90
The upshot of the foregoing is that police, with probable
cause to believe that a minor offense has occurred, yet having a
mere hunch of greater wrongdoing, can argue with constitution-
al justification that they could have arrested an individual, even
if they do not. They can then lawfully conduct a body (or auto)
search, and, if nothing more incriminating is discovered, engage
in the time-honored practice of setting the individual free with a
citation or warning.' 9' Alternatively, in the absence of even a
hunch of greater wrongdoing, police can arrest and search, and
discover a basis justifying pursuit of a more serious prosecution,
which itself too often pressures courts to indulgently assess al-
ready lax probable cause standards. 9' Finally, police can poten-
18 See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (describing the standard as tantamount to a "fair
probability);Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1227 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"probable cause itself is a relatively low threshold of proof"). As Bill Stuntz recognized
several years before Atwater was decided, "In a world where trivial crimes stay on the
books, or one where routine traffic offenses count as crimes, the requirement of probable
cause to arrest may mean almost nothing." William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997).
,87 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S 675, 686 (1985) (requiring that police "dili-
gently pursueD a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspi-
cions quickly").
88 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 406 F.3d 915, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying
federal law); Wilkes v. State, 774 A.2d 420, 438 (Md. 2001).
8 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
8 Carpenter, 406 F.3d at 916-17.
181 See LAFAVE, supra note 157, at 186-88, 484-85 (noting widespread police "arrest
and release" in the 1950s and 1960s); Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to
Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 359-62 (1936) (describing same
practice during the first decades of the twentieth century).
" See State v. Overby, 590 N.W.2d 703, 708 (N.D. 1999) (Vande Walle, C.J., concur-
ring) (expressing concern that "with the expectation or hope that the search will produce
such irrefutable evidence of the commission of a crime that a lack of probable cause to
arrest prior to the search will be overlooked or such suspicion as did exist will be viewed
more favorably in light of the evidence discovered in the search if, in fact, there is evi-
dence discovered"); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 221 (1975) ("The
illegality of a search is likely to be tempered-even in the eyes of the judiciary-by the
REASONABLENESS AS A RULE
tially use Atwater to threaten arrest for a minor offense, pre-
suming probable cause exists to support such an arrest, in order
to secure "voluntary" consent to search,193 which depending on
the outcome of the search, can result in a more serious prosecu-
tion, or immediate freedom for the individual. Under any of
these scenarios, Justice O'Connor's prediction in Atwater of a
"grave potential for abuse" comes to fruition.'
C. "Mistakes" of Law
Atwater's apotheosis of probable cause and substantive laws
has also served to heighten the importance of the latitude af-
forded police in their misapprehension of the laws they invoke
to justify arrests. Historically, of course, lack of knowledge or
misunderstanding of criminal laws has been rejected as a basis
for citizens to avoid criminal liability. 9' With respect to police,
courts typically reject government arguments that an officer's
misapprehension of an invoked law can justify a seizure, on the
view that enforcement of a non-existent legal standard itself is
not objectively reasonable.' To find such a seizure justified
would be to countenance a "failure to understand the law by the
very person charged with enforcing it. ""' Doing so, furthermore,
"would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they
discovery of incriminating evidence on the suspect."); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amend-
ment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994) ("Judges do not like excluding
bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming that the Fourth Amendment was not
really violated.").
See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 183, at § 8.2(c).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 (Belknapp Press, 1963):
It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not
have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit [legal mistakes] as an
excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has de-
termined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly
outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.
For competing views surveying exceptions to the precept in modern case law, see Sharon
L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance,
48 DUKE L.J. 341 (1998) (focusing on crimes that require willfulness mens rea); Dan M.
Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV.
127 (1997) (focusing on malum prohibitum crimes).
4 LAFAVE, supra note 183, at § 9.5 (citing cases).
"' United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005).
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properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce
and obey." 98
This core understanding, however, has been eroded in re-
cent years. Even though the law-fact distinction is not always
clear-cut, 9 ' police are forgiven reasonable mistakes of fact, on
which probable cause is based."' Moreover, legal standards
themselves often admit of substantial interpretive flexibility.
For instance, whether a car is operated on the streets in "good
mechanical condition" is a legally and factually loaded determi-
nation made by officers-a determination in which they enjoy
considerable legal latitude."'
In some courts, however, the line-drawing enterprise itself
is of no moment. In the Eighth Circuit, for instance, officers are
forgiven mistakes of law and fact alike. There, if an officer seiz-
es an individual based on a mistaken understanding of the law
she is enforcing, "the legal determination of whether probable
cause or reasonable suspicion existed for the stop is judged by
whether the mistake of law was an 'objectively reasonable
one.' 202 The Eighth Circuit's stance is shared by several states,
" United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). See also People
v. Teresinski, 605 P.2d 874, 877 (Cal. 1980) (asserting that a contrary rule "would pro-
vide a strong incentive to police officers to remain ignorant of the language of the laws
and of the teachings of judicial decisions whose principal function frequently is to con-
strue such laws and to chart the proper limits of police conduct.").
" See generally 6 LAFAVE, supra note 183, at § 11.7(c).
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 496 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v.
Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying New York law); United States v. Flores-
Sandoval, 366 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying U.S. law). See also Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S 194, 206 (2001) ("Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the
facts establishing the existence of probable cause .... ."); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 185-86 (1990) (noting that factual determinations made by police need not "always
be correct," but they always must be "reasonable"); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,
87 (1987) ("[Tlhe Court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest
[factual] mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of
making arrests and executing search warrants.").
" See State v. Beauregard, 820 A.2d 183, 183 (Vt. 2003). See also, e.g., United
States v. Valdez, 147 Fed. App'x. 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2005) (construing Tennessee law
providing that a vehicle "shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable
and prudent").
' United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted);
see also United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[In our circuit, the
distinction between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact is irrelevant to the fourth
amendment inquiry.... [In mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake,
whether of law or fact, was an objectively reasonable one.").
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which also forgive objectively reasonable mistakes of law by po-
lice, that is, unlawful but not unreasonable arrests. °3 Georgia
goes even further, asking whether officers acted in good faith:
If the officer acting in good faith believes that an unlawful
act has been committed, his actions are not rendered improper
by a later legal determination that the defendant's actions
were not a crime according to a technical legal definition or
distinction determined to exist in the penal statute. It is not
the officer's function to determine on the spot such matters as.
the legal niceties in definition of a certain crime, for these
are matters for the courts. 4
Meanwhile, other courts have signaled their generosity in
motions to suppress by emphasizing that officers are not to be
held to the standard of a prospective lawyer "taking the bar ex-
am,"205 and do not need to carry a "Decennial Digest" on the
job.0 6 As the Ninth Circuit has observed, an officer need not
"have a precise appreciation of the niceties of the law. If the
facts are sufficient to lead an officer to reasonably believe that
there was a violation, that will suffice, even if the officer is not
certain about exactly what it takes to constitute a violation."
207
Thus, unlike Alford, where a legal mistake was forgiven be-
cause there existed unspecified alternative legal bases to justify
the arrest, in the cases just noted no valid legal basis existed to
support Fourth Amendment seizures."' Whether the Court's
See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1138-39 (Miss. 2001); State v. Greer,
683 N.E.2d 82, 86 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
McConnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). McConnell's focus on
subjective good faith would appear to be on weak footing after Whren; to date, however,
Georgia courts seemingly have not deviated from the position. See, e.g., Dixon v. State,
609 S.E.2d 148, 150-51 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). But see Cash v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1267,
1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "simple good faith on the part of the arresting
officer is not enough. If it were, 'the protection of the Fourth Amendment would evapo-
rate.'" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968))).
United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000).
Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bodzin v. City of Dal-
las, 768 F.2d 722, 725 (5th Cir. 1985)).
"" United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002).
What the tendency means for civil rights actions sounding in false arrest and the
right of citizens to resist unlawful arrests remains to be seen. See, e.g., State v. Lindsay,
388 So. 2d 781, 782 (La. 1980) ("It is a long-established principle in Louisiana law that a
citizen has the right to resist an unlawful arrest."); Rifle v. Armstrong, 477 S.E.2d 535,
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recent decision in Herring v. United States,"' making applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule depend upon "deliberate" and
"culpable" police errors,21 will invigorate the tendency toward
forgiving reasonable police mistakes remains to be seen.2
There is no mistaking, however, that the indulgence undercuts
vagueness doctrine, with its foremost concern over arbitrary
police enforcement,2"2 and qualifies as a highly troubling devel-
opment in a society that prides itself on its dedication to the
rule of law 3 and refuses to forgive similar citizen misunders-
tandings.2"4 Not only do police now wield the power to act as de
facto legislators, based on their discretionary authority to in-
voke (or nor invoke) extant laws, as Bill Stuntz has noted."'
They also have the concomitant power to detain individuals for
behavior never even legislatively proscribed.
549 (W. Va. 1996) (noting that false arrest claim must be supported by proof of no legal
authority to arrest).
129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
21 See id. at 702 ("To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficient-
ly deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.").
... Of course, attenuation doctrine further dilutes police incentive to master the
substance of the laws they are expected to enforce. For instance, if voluntary consent to
search is secured, such consent can cure a legally invalid stop or arrest, barring applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule and allowing admission of any evidence or contraband
obtained by the search. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
.2 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1983). On this connection
more generally see Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from
Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398 (2001).
Importantly, in light of the judicial tendency to forgive police legal mistakes, legislative
efforts to codify more detailed laws in order to limit police discretion and guard against
successful vagueness challenges can have the opposite effect of facilitating indulgence of
police mistakes of law. This is because the more intricate laws become, the greater the
latitude police will be afforded for their legal mistakes. Cf. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling
Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1525-26 (2007) (noting that efforts to make
laws more specific have not appreciably lessened the discretionary authority of police).
213 See generally RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA (2001). Cf TffE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 21 (U.S. 1776) (condemning use by British Crown
of "pretended offences" to harass colonists); FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 3 (Willa Muir &
Edwin Muir trans., Random House 1956) (1925) ("Someone must have traduced Joseph
K, for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning.").
21 See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (recog-
nizing "the fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that ig-
norance of the law is no excuse,' while allowing those 'entrusted to enforce' the law to be
ignorant of it.") (citations omitted).
215 William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 24 (1996).
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CONCLUSION
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
is notable both for its steadfast fidelity to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness and its astute recognition of the personal and
jurisprudential consequences of its abandonment. Wise at its
time of issuance, moreover, the dissent has proved prescient.
Rather than being merely "speculative," the "dearth of hor-
ribles" posited by the Atwater majority was and remains an em-
pirical reality, predictably inspiring other troublesome practic-
es, as outlined above. Stepping back, one can only hope that
Justice O'Connor's dissent, like other great dissents, "may sal-
vage for tomorrow the principle that was sacrificed or forgotten
today. " 6
"' William 0. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 JUDICATURE 104,
107 (1948). See also CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 68 (1928) ("A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit
of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.").
20091

